Styles of Writing and the Afghanistan Model by Yeo, Andrew
Document Title: Styles of W riting and the Afghanistan Model 
Author: Andrew Yeo
Course: Government 100.03 
Course Title: Power and Politics: Power, Tragedy, and H onor—Three Faces of W ar 
Year: Spring 2007
Copyright Statement:
This m aterial is copyrighted by the author and m ade available through the Cornell University 
eCommons Digital Repository under a Creative Commons Attribution, Non-Commercial License.
This docum ent is part of the John  S. Knight W riting in the Disciplines eCommons community. 
http://ecom m ons.library.cornell.edu
Styles of Writing and the Afghanistan Model of Warfare 
Submitted for the Spring 2007 Knight Award for Writing Exercises and Handout
Govt 100.3: Power, Tragedy, and Honor: The Three Faces of War 
Instructor: Andrew Yeo
Political scientists read a wide variety of sources to keep abreast on domestic and 
international news. I designed this assignment to familiarize students with different styles of 
writing in political science (or more specifically, international relations and foreign policy 
analysis). Undergraduate students interested in international politics follow world events 
through different newspapers, magazines, TV news programs, the internet, or news magazines. 
However, when studying international relations, students are assigned academic or policy 
journals which provide more substantive content and analysis. Students will find that academic 
journals, policy journals, and popular media will all vary in style, prose, and political orientation. 
For instance, I assigned two articles about air power by Robert Pape to coincide with the week 
students participated in the styles of writing exercise: one was published in Foreign Affairs, the 
other was published as an op-ed in the New York Times. The main arguments were identical, but 
the style of writing differed substantially. Unlike the succinct, normative driven New York Times 
op-ed piece, Pape provided more historical background and technical information in his Foreign 
Affairs article. Pape also used more “foreign policy jargon” and provided a much more nuanced 
treatment of alternative arguments and explanations. Interestingly, these articles were based on 
Pape’s academic press book, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Cornell 
University Press 1996). Although I did not assign the book, I centered my class discussion 
around his theories of strategic air coercion and used the book to also illustrate “academic” style 
of writing compared to “policy” writing and “op-ed” writing.
I used “Styles of Writing and the Afghanistan Model,” as an in-class writing exercise.
I designed the assignment with four goals in mind. I wanted students to learn how to 1) 
distinguish between different sources in political science: academic journals, policy journals, 
newspapers, and news magazines; 2) identify the type of content each source tended to provide;
3) recognize the style of writing in each source and its intended audience; and 4) adopt an 
appropriate style of writing for their own work.
I also wanted students to recognize differences in style and prose since I built in 
assignments throughout the course which would require different styles of writing. For instance, 
students were expected to write an essay in favor or against the use of precision guided weapons 
in the style of an op-ed article. Another essay required students to choose a theoretical level of 
analysis when explaining the causes of international conflict, and then use the Korean War as a 
case study to test their theory. An essay towards the end of the semester was written as a UN 
policy paper recommending action on Darfur, Sudan, based on past failures of the international 
community during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Students were expected to adopt an appropriate 
style of writing for each assignment.
I included this in-class assignment during week six when we discussed tactics and 
strategy in war. On week six, day one (Feb. 27), students read a policy article, magazine article, 
and op-ed piece on the use of air power in war. On week six, day two (Mar. 1), students read an 
excerpt from an academic book, policy article, and a newspaper article on technology and new 
military strategy. The readings were selected to give students exposure to a variety of writing 
styles. The actual in-class exercise was then based on one of the assigned readings for the week: 
Biddle, Stephen. "Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare." Foreign Affairs 82, no. 2 (2003).
I chose the introduction to this article, and the introduction (or first few paragraphs) of 
three other articles which were all about the “Afghanistan Model” of combat (reliance on high- 
tech gadgets and special operations forces). However, each excerpt was taken from a different 
type of source. The four articles I used are provided below:
1) Policy Article (Foreign Affairs)
Biddle, Stephen. "Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare." Foreign Affairs 82 (2), 2003.
2) Academic article (International Security)
Andres, Richard B, Craig Wills, and Thomas E. Griffith. “Winning with Allies; The Strategic 
Value of the Afghan Model.” International Security 30 (3), 2005.
3) Popular press (USA Today)
Moniz, Dave. “Afghanistan's lessons shaping new military.” USA Today. October 8, 2002, p.13A.
4) In-depth newspaper analysis/op-ed (The New York Times)
Gordon, Michael. “Gains and Limits in New Low-Risk War.” The New York Times. December 
29, 2001, Section A; Column 3.
Students were asked to write down any differences in style they noted in the excerpts. I 
also provided the following additional questions for students to reflect on before discussing the 
excerpts as a group: What are some plausible sources of these excerpts (i.e. newspaper, 
academic journal, popular press)? Which introductions were easy or hard to read? Did you notice 
any difference in the choice of words or phrases? Who do you think was the intended audience 
of the article? I gave the students 10-15 minutes to write down their answers. As a class, 
students then tried to guess possible sources for each excerpt. We then discussed differences in 
writing style among the four excerpts.
Assignment: Below are excerpts from four different types of sources. All four sources were taken from 
the introduction, and discuss the war in Afghanistan after 9/11 which led to a shift in strategy and tactics 
by the U.S. military. After reading each excerpt, write down any differences in style you noted in the 
excerpts below. To help you get started, you might consider the following questions: What are some 
plausible sources of these excerpts (i.e. newspaper, academic journal, popular press)? Which 
introductions were easy/hard to read? Did you notice any difference in the choice of words or phrases? 
Who do you think was the intended audience of the article? How might the language or style change 
depending on the author’s intended audience?
1) America's novel use of special operations forces (SOF), precision weapons, and indigenous allies has 
attracted widespread attention since its debut in Afghanistan, proving both influential and controversial. 
Many believe it was responsible for the Taliban's sudden collapse. They see the "Afghan model" as 
warfare's future and think it should become the new template for U.S. defense planning. Others, however, 
see Afghanistan as an anomaly -- a non-repeatable product of local conditions. Both camps are wrong.
The Afghan campaign does indeed offer important clues to the future of warfare, but not the ones most 
people think -- because the war itself was not fought the way most people think. Both sides in the debate 
assume that the Afghan campaign was waged at standoff ranges, with precision weapons annihilating 
enemies at a distance, before they could close with U.S. commandos or indigenous allies. For proponents 
of the Afghan model, this is what gives the model its broad utility: with SOF-guided bombs doing the real 
killing at a distance, even ragtag local militias will suffice as allies. For Afghan model detractors, 
conversely, it is the apparent ability to annihilate from afar that makes the campaign seem so anomalous 
and a product of idiosyncratic local factors.
2) The military campaign in Afghanistan was a striking success for a new style of warfare, in which 
American commandos took center stage and played a vital role in organizing the Afghan resistance and 
directing punishing airstrikes. The novel strategy enabled the United States to topple the Taliban, install a 
friendly government and ensure that Al Qaeda could no longer use Afghanistan as a base for terrorism. 
Those ends were achieved with a small number of American ground troops, with little political backlash 
in the Muslim world about an "occupying" Western army and with a very limited loss of American lives. 
Having brought important gains at modest cost, this is an approach the Pentagon may be tempted to repeat 
as it plans military campaigns against Iraq or terrorist organizations around the world. But the American 
strategy also had a decided drawback: the decision to let proxy forces bear the brunt of the ground 
fighting may have allowed many Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders, and possibly Osama bin Laden himself, 
to escape.
3) In this article, we argue that the pessimism that has characterized analysis of the Afghan model is 
misplaced. Airpower, special forces, and indigenous troops (even those with relatively little training) form 
a powerful and robust combination. While events in Afghanistan and later in northern Iraq demonstrated 
the costs and the benefits of using the model, when these are compared with the costs and benefits of 
deploying heavy divisions, and particularly the costs of creating new governments without indigenous 
war allies, the model performs well. Moreover, because this new way of war lowers the costs to the 
United States, in both blood and treasure, it creates a more credible stick to use in coercive diplomacy 
against small- and medium-sized opponents than do threats of conventional invasion. The lesson of 
Afghanistan and Iraq is that, when used correctly, the Afghan model offers the United States strategic 
advantage and leverage abroad. Below we analyze how this new way of war performed in Afghanistan 
and later in Iraq. The study explores how the techniques came about in the face of a largely skeptical 
military establishment, why they worked, and some of their strengths and weaknesses. We conclude with 
a discussion of the strategic implications of the model for future U.S. military diplomacy.
4) Without a single battle tank or armored troop carrier, the United States and a ragtag rebel army routed 
Afghanistan's Taliban to claim the first major battle of the 21st century. The Pentagon's most important 
weapons: elite commandos riding into battle on horseback and thousands of satellite-guided smart bombs. 
But any elation over America's sudden victory in Afghanistan was tempered by spotty intelligence, 
civilian casualties, training that isn't tailored to fighting terrorists and the vexing uncertainty over whether 
al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden is alive or dead. Those successes and failures have prompted the 
military to re-examine many fundamental practices, from how it recruits special operations troops to how 
it trains to fight agile, shadowy foes. Some of the changes were under way before Sept. 11, 2001. But it's 
clear that the war on terrorism will lead to robust funding for defense, radically new weapons, 
unconventional battlefield tactics and closer ties between the uniformed military and U.S. intelligence 
agencies.
